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Introduction
1. With its geographic location, potential, ambi-
tions and political priorities, Uzbekistan could
play a leading role in Central Asia. The interna-
tional community has perceived the country as
the pillar of stability in the region. This percep-
tion was further reinforced after 11th September
2001 and was certainly among the factors that
inspired the United States to start closer political
and military cooperation with Tashkent. The ad-
ministration in Washington had expected that
closer contacts might galvanise political, econo-
mic and social change in Uzbekistan, thus rein-
forcing positive trends in other countries of the
region as well. But the relations between Wa-
shington and Tashkent are in crisis (which the
United States will certainly try to overcome), and
we have seen rapprochement between Uzbeki-
stan and Russia and China.
2. Uzbekistan is slipping ever deeper into econo-
mic and social crisis, and the forecasts are pessi-
mistic. The scale of problems (which could be
tackled through genuine reforms, but not an imi-
tation of reforms) and the uncertainty as to how
the political situation will develop (which causes
interest groups to brace themselves for expected
change) may threaten the country’s stability.
Should the political and social order in Uzbeki-
stan break down, the entire Central Asia will be-
come deeply destabilised. It is worrying that the
negative trends in Uzbekistan are on the rise
and in the present circumstances they seem al-
most impossible to reverse. 
3. Uzbekistan’s potential of instability is the
product of the country’s internal policies. In the
economy, the authorities implemented wrong
economic policies, failed to liberalise and open
the market, conserved the centrally planned mo-
del of economy and inadequately distribute bud-
get revenues (a large portion of which is spent
on the oversized administration and the excessi-
vely extended security apparatus). As a result, on-
ly limited cooperation with international finance
institutions is possible. In politics, the clans con-
tinue to vie for influence and various interest
groups are likely to step up their struggle to take
over power in the country. There is no serious se-
cular alternative to the existing order, and mo-
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derate Islam ideology (not radical but still inde-
pendent of the state administration) have been
eliminated. As a result, the fundamentalist Isla-
mic ideology now attracts growing numbers of
supporters.
4. Repression against the opposition (real and
perceived) has radicalised large sections of the
society. The suicide terror attacks (in late March/
early April and on 30th July), which happened for
the first time in Uzbekistan’s history and targeted
the state security apparatus, were symptomatic
of the direction of developments. It is very prob-
able that more such attacks will take place.
I. The social and economic 
situation
The economic situation of Uzbekistan is the ma-
jor source of social discontent and tension in the
country. The Uzbek economy has stagnated for
quite long1, and the economic system is ineffi-
cient and incapable of meeting the demands of
Central Asia’s most populous society. 
With the economy twined with politics, it is im-
possible to implement genuine reforms, and the
increasingly impoverished society is not prepared
to take on the burden of such reforms.
The authorities are at pains to conserve the status
quo in the economy because that is the way to
continue cashing in profits and keep the principal
instruments of political and social control. The
existing system benefits narrow social groups –
the ruling elite which emerged from regional and
clan structures and has links to those structures
as well as mafia groups. Those groups have divi-
ded power among them, with different regional
groupings and clans controlling various sectors
of the economy2.
Another reason why the ruling elite deliberately
refrains from reforms is the fear of unavoidable
adverse consequences of transformation, i.e. the
social costs such as unemployment, which might
deepen people’s frustration and undermine the
state’s stability. However, the present situation
in Uzbekistan shows that this avoidance tactic is
backfiring. Even though Uzbekistan failed to im-
plement necessary reforms (as the neighbours
such as Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan have done to
a smaller or greater extent) the country did not
manage to avoid the enormous social costs, the
burden of which continues to grow3. 
Living standards are declining for most of the so-
ciety. Salaries are low4 and insufficient to provide
a living for families as the prices of goods and
services rise continually as a result of inflation
and the state’s financial policy. On top of that,
pay is frequently delayed. To support their fami-
lies, Uzbeks have to seek other sources of income,
but no new jobs are created. In recent years, job
migration has been rising, especially to Russia
and Kazakhstan5 where incomes can be even ten
times as high as in Uzbekistan (the number of
people leaving for Kazakhstan doubled between
2000 and 20026). Unfortunately, going abroad for
work may be risky and dangerous: Uzbeks are
frequently humiliated by the local people and/or
the police, attacked, injured or even killed. In 
a new phenomenon, more Uzbek women go to
work in the border areas of Kyrgyzstan7. 
1. The cotton sector
Agriculture and the cotton sector in particular
are subordinated to the state and its goals8. Ana-
chronous and designed to preserve the status quo
at any cost, the agricultural policy of Uzbekistan
is one of the key factors that conserve the entire
system and block reforms. At the same time, it
breeds serious social and economic tension9 and
regional conflicts (between the centre and the
provinces). It is also one of the major instru-
ments of political and economic influence for
certain narrow groups, and conserves various
adverse phenomena such as corruption of state
officials and paternalistic and mafia relations. 
Controlling the procurement and export of cot-
ton and the distribution channels of export pro-
ceeds is obviously a source of wealth for some
people and groups, and a cause for rivalry be-
tween interest groups. It is no accident that Is-
mail Jurabekov, the Samarkand clan leader, was
considered to be one of the most powerful figures
in the country, one of the reasons for this being
that he controlled the cotton business10.
Land in Uzbekistan has not been privatised, but
individuals are allowed to lease agricultural plots
for up to 49 years and, in theory, they are free to
decide what kind of crops they want to grow11.
In practice, however, farmers are forced to grow
cotton, even though it only profits the state mo-
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nopoly. Frequently, in order to get the lease per-
mit farmers must agree to grow cotton in a part
(e.g. 50 percent) of their land, and if they refuse,
they may be disconnected from the irrigation sys-
tem. Local state officials supervise farms for com-
pliance with the regulations. Such restrictions
are motivated by the state’s strategic interests in
the cotton sector: nearly half of Uzbekistan’s ex-
port revenue (US$ 1.5 billion in 2002) comes from
the sale of cotton (Uzbekistan is the world’s fifth
largest cotton producer and the second largest
cotton exporter)12. Consequently, the volume of
the state’s revenue depends on the price of cot-
ton in global markets and on the weather situa-
tion. For example, in 2003 heavy rains occurred
in spring. As a result cotton yield decreased from
3.2 million tons in 2002 to 2.85 million tons and
the production volume of cotton fibre dropped
by more than 6 percent to 945.9 thousand tons13. 
Each year, the state bodies (including the Minis-
try of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the pro-
secutor’s office and the security service), the local
elite, mafia groups and ordinary citizens fight 
a “battle for cotton”. The state implements active
measures to increase the output of cotton, and
since it is exclusively authorised to procure cot-
ton, prices paid to farmers are very low, some-
times even 20 times lower than in the neighbour
countries. In 2002, farmers were paid 125 sums
(10–12 US cents) per 1 kilogram of cotton, but
sometimes they get no pay at all for their work.
Such low procurement prices guarantee high
proceeds when cotton is sold abroad. Each year,
a target for the cotton output is set, and the ho-
kims (district governors) are held accountable for
the achievement of this target14. Governors em-
ploy all resources available to meet the demands,
sending the personnel of government bodies, stu-
dents and even children to help with the harvest.
The impoverished society is busy smuggling cot-
ton to neighbouring republics. The state tries to
counter this, and president Karimov himself, as
well as the security services, get involved in the
anti-smuggling campaigns. During harvest time,
additional road checkpoints are established and
border controls are stepped up. People are re-
ported to have been killed in the course of anti-
smuggling operations carried out by the border
services.
2. The finance system – state supervi-
sion and barrier to development
Compared to other CIS countries and even the
neighbour republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan, the finance system of Uzbekistan is
underdeveloped and to a large extent it is a bot-
tleneck of the country’s economic development.
At the same time it is also one of the most im-
portant instruments of state control.
Since the mid 1990s when stricter regulations on
foreign currency trade were enacted after a short
spell of more liberal statutes international finan-
ce institutions have made repeated calls for a uni-
form exchange rate of the national currency –
the sum (UZS) to be introduced and for full libera-
lisation of access to foreign currency. The govern-
ment of Uzbekistan announced a liberalisation
of the finance market, but the outcome of this li-
beralisation shows that the measures implemen-
ted by the government have little in common
with what the government had pledged to do.
Making the sum convertible in October 2003 sol-
ved only some of the finance market’s problems. 
2.1. The banking system
The state owns banks in Uzbekistan, including
commercial banks in which it holds majority sha-
res15. The principal task of the banks is therefore
to implement the state’s policy. Hence, their role
as profit-oriented, commercial institutions is of
secondary importance. The central bank has ex-
tensive powers: it influences economic processes
(e.g. by regulating the supply of cash), is able to
manipulate economic indexes (such as inflation
of exchange rates), and appoints and dismisses
management boards of other banks.
Banks are state bodies in Uzbekistan and citizens
do not trust them, especially since they lose prac-
tically all control of they money once it is paid to
a banking account16. Bank customers are at pains
to minimise the amounts of money deposited
with banks, but banks resort to administrative
measures to collect deposits: there is an official
requirement that bodies corporate deposit all of
their financial resources with banks, and most
types of transactions are legally required to be
cashless.
U
z
b
e
k
is
ta
n
: 
th
e
 m
a
jo
r 
s
o
u
rc
e
 o
f 
in
s
ta
b
il
it
y
 i
n
 C
e
n
tr
a
l 
A
s
ia
?
70
C E S  S t u d i e s
2.2. Money circulation
The cash problem, i.e. cash shortages at banks,
is among those maladies of the Uzbek finance
system that the society (both individuals and
businesses) and foreign investors find the most
troublesome. The underlying cause of the cash
shortage is that the Uzbek currency exists in two
forms: cash (more valuable and preferred as the
mode of payment) and bank money (less pre-
ferred; because of the regulations in force it is dif-
ficult to exchange bank money for cash and the
former is the obligatory mode of transactions be-
tween private companies; in illegal17 transactions
bank money is worth 80–85 percent of its cash
equivalent). Preserving the economically-harm-
ful system with two forms of money profits the
state and higher officials of commercial banks
and the central bank18. It enables the state to con-
trol the circulation of money and the entire eco-
nomy, and delegates responsibility for cash pay-
ments of salaries, scholarships and pensions to
the banks, whom the central bank provides with
the less-preferred bank money. In this way any
delays19 in the payment of benefits are blamed on
the banks, who do not have enough cash in their
vaults because they have to deposit cash with
the central bank on a daily basis. 
2.3. Currency convertibility
Until recently, Uzbekistan had three different ex-
change rates of the US dollar (the principal hard
currency): two official rates plus the black mar-
ket rate. The difference between the official and
the black market exchange rate could even reach
100 percent, which made foreign currency trade
a very profitable business. The government has
limited the number of businesses authorised to
provide money exchange services (permissions
are granted in an arbitrary manner, providing 
a source of wealth to certain groups) and forces
exporters to transfer all or part of their foreign
currency revenues to the state. Such unnatural re-
gulations profit the state (allowing it to improve
its balance of payments), as well as businesses
authorised to trade foreign currencies20 and go-
vernment officials at ministries and customs
agencies in charge of granting foreign exchange
licences.
The government of Uzbekistan agreed to lift the
finance market restrictions (the 31st January 2002
agreement with the IMF, conclusions of the EBRD
summit in Tashkent on 4th–5th May 2003, and
pressure of international finance institutions). In
April 2002 uniform exchange rates were intro-
duced, and the amount of money that each citi-
zen was allowed to exchange every quarter was
increased. Officially, the Uzbek currency – the
sum – is fully convertible as of 15th October 2003,
and bodies corporate are allowed to purchase
foreign currency for the purpose of their foreign
trade operations. But the hopes for a rapid im-
provement of the finance market proved futile
because liberalisation of access to foreign curren-
cy (some restrictions remain in place) was not fol-
lowed by an easing of the cash control policy.
Only banks and private businesses controlled by
the state hold licences for the provision of cur-
rency exchange services, and they purchase and
sell foreign currency at the (excessively high) ra-
tes set by the central bank. The limited supply of
cash is hardly conducive to free access to foreign
currency purchase and sale transactions. With
the limited availability of the sum, selling dol-
lars poses a problem. As a result, the black mar-
ket continues to exist, where the dollar is traded
at a price lower by 2–3 sums. In 2004, the cen-
tral bank imposed cash supply control twice (in
March and June). The central bank is also autho-
rised to stop currency exchange transactions in
a certain area or at certain banks by blocking the
central bank’s server at which all such transac-
tions have to be processed, and it frequently
exercises this right.
3. Problems of small and medium
enterprises 
The SME sector in Uzbekistan struggles with
endless problems. Most of them are of systemic
nature and effectively stifle the development of
small and medium enterprises. Concepts of cen-
trally planned economy continue to restrict their
opportunities21 as unprofitable large industrial es-
tablishments remain the economic priority. This
is connected with the concepts of economic and
political security, the principal objective of which
is to keep high levels of employment at the large,
unprofitable, state-owned enterprises22, even if
they have to be subsidised. In order to conserve
this costly economic model23, the state has resor-
ted to complex fiscal mechanisms (taxes on agri-
cultural production, the energy sector, export;
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high customs duties on imported goods, espe-
cially those competing with domestically-manu-
factured equivalents; tax holidays for selected
establishments) and restricted access to foreign
currency. 
Small and medium enterprises fell victim to those
restrictions. They are not able to compete with
state-owned businesses which have access to
subsidised credits and until recently could also
purchase foreign currency at lower rates. As a
result, small businesses paid for their imports
three times as much as large enterprises in 2002,
according to the World Bank. Other difficulties
that small and medium enterprises have to cope
with include the requirement to acquire various
licences and permits to start a business, and im-
pediments created by local administration and
tax officials, or even officers of the law enforce-
ment and security services. Bureaucratic formali-
ties provide a lot of opportunities for abuse by
local officials who frequently demand bribes for
granting licences, foregoing checks or overlooking
irregularities24. 
The government’s declarations on more exten-
sive assistance to the private sector (e.g. the pre-
sident’s decree of 24th January 2002) are not re-
flected in the actual regulations that are enacted.
The November 2002 decree empowered local
authorities to re-nationalise and resell businesses
that change the scope of their operations with-
out the authorities’ permission. A decree issued
a month later imposed much stricter require-
ments on the issuance of wholesale licences. The
most controversial and most widely criticised
move by the government was to impose25 drastic
customs duties on imported goods: 50 percent
on industrial products and 90 percent on other
products (in autumn 2002, the rates were redu-
ced to 40 percent and 70 percent, respectively, as
a result of the society’s resistance and criticism
by the IMF). Characteristically, both decrees and
regulations are signed by one and the same per-
son – Islam Karimov – as president in the case of
decrees and head of the Council of Ministers in
the case of regulations. 
All importers are required to possess documents
attesting that they have paid the customs duty
and that their goods meet the security and
health standards. The new regulations affected
most badly small bazaar importers and traders
of cheap clothing and other merchandise, the
drivers and carriers cooperating with them, as
well as small restaurant owners. They also caused
a shortage of certain goods in the market and
consequently, an increase in prices and mass
shopping trips to the border-area bazaars in Ka-
zakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Using sani-
tary protection of the country as a pretext, the
authorities of Uzbekistan closed borders with
neighbouring countries in December 2002 and
January 2003. High state officials and the press
resorted to unfriendly rhetoric as they criticised
the “aggressive” economic policies of neighbour
countries. Ultimately, the government regulations
created a serious crisis and social tension in Uzbe-
kistan (bazaar traders closed down their stands)
and led to demonstrations and unrest (e.g. in
Tashkent on 25th – 26th July or 4th September) and
even clashes between the police and the mer-
chants and traders. As a result, the number of
small trade businesses decreased, many busi-
nesspeople had their goods confiscated and others
chose to stay in business illegally, paying bribes
to customs officials and controllers.
4. Less cooperation with 
international finance institutions
11th September 2001 marked a caesura in Uzbe-
kistan’s relations with international finance and
aid institutions. Before that date, they were open-
ly disappointed with the ambivalent approach of
Uzbek authorities to the recommended reforms
(in spring 2001, the IMF had closed its Tashkent
office). But in the autumn of 2001 and spring of
2002 the situation changed in favour of Uzbe-
kistan. In November 2001 the EBRD granted Uz-
bekistan two large credits for the modernisation
of rail transport and municipal infrastructures
worth a total of US$ 85 million, and the Wa-
shington administration managed to persuade
the IMF to resume cooperation with Tashkent.
On 31st January 2002 a cooperation agreement
was signed between the Uzbek government and
the IMF, which opened prospects of credit assis-
tance for various projects in Uzbekistan.
Yet the expectations of finance institutions never
materialised. Already in 2002, import duties
were increased drastically (as mentioned before),
and in late 2002 and early 2003 borders with the
neighbouring countries were closed, which ran
counter to the requirement to create favourable
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conditions for small businesses and to liberalise
trade in the region.
In 2003 and the first half of 2004 the relations
between Uzbekistan and international finance
institutions deteriorated further, although still
on 31st December 2003 the EBRD had signed an
agreement under which it was to finance 21 pro-
jects in Uzbekistan worth a total of EUR 527 mil-
lion26. The underlying cause of this decline was
Uzbekistan’s reluctance to implement a genuine
reform program. The idea to hold the annual ses-
sion of the EBRD Board of Directors in Tashkent
provoked a lot of controversy. Opponents pointed
that organising the session in Tashkent would
imply that the EBRD approves of the political sit-
uation and economic policy of Uzbekistan. The
session was held nevertheless, but it was con-
cluded with an appeal to the authorities in Tash-
kent to liberalise the finance system and trade
with neighbouring republics, and to democra-
tise political life. A warning was also given that
aid programs would be suspended should the
Uzbek authorities fail to comply. Finance institu-
tions welcomed the liberalisation of the foreign
currency market announced in October 2003,
but they made a reservation that this should not
be seen as a panacea for all problems with which
the Uzbek economy was struggling. 
Organisations cooperating with Uzbekistan, and
especially the EBRD, increasingly made it clear
that further assistance would be granted only if
the country’s economic policy were mended and
the political situation improved, including true
democratisation of the political system, allow-
ing political pluralism and respecting human
rights27. Disappointed with the fact that Uzbeki-
stan made hardly any progress in those fields,
the EBRD announced on 6th April 2004 that it
was going to limit its commitments in Uzbeki-
stan solely to projects that directly benefit the
society (private sector, public sector financing of
border-area activities).
Other major finance institutions continue their
operations in Uzbekistan. The Asian Development
Bank is the only institution willing to grant
higher credits28, while others, e.g. the World
Bank, allocate relatively small amounts (approx.
US$ 50 million a year, mostly for infrastructure
projects) which do not necessarily have to be
used.
5. Unfavourable investment climate
Western investors are ever less willing to commit
capital to Uzbekistan. In 2002, the already low
foreign investments decreased by 22 percent to
US$ 65 million29. Per capita direct foreign invest-
ments amounted to just 2.5 US$ in 200230.
This affects the volume of trade exchange. The
results of a 2002 research by the EBRD and the
World Bank suggest that among the 27 countries
in transformation that were studied, Uzbekistan
was the only one in which the total volume of tra-
de exchange (including both export and import)
decreased in 2002 below the level at the start of
transformation and accounted for 76.6 percent of
the 1993 level31 (133.6 percent in Kyrgyzstan,
139.0 percent in Tajikistan). The unfavourable cli-
mate for business in Uzbekistan, including bu-
reaucracy and corruption, a banking system com-
pletely out of pace with market economy condi-
tions and the persistent problems in the curren-
cy market, discourage western companies from
launching businesses in Uzbekistan, and those
already present in the country limit the scope of
their operations32. It should be noted, however,
that an opposite trend holds for great Russian
capital, which is presently favoured by the
authorities of Uzbekistan (e.g. LUKoil signed a
contract for US$ 1 billion worth of investments
in the gas sector in June this year, and in July
MTS of Russia purchased 74 percent of shares 
in Uzbekistan’s largest mobile network Uzdon-
robita for US$ 120 million). 
According to the World Bank, the drastic decrease
in foreign investments in Uzbekistan (to the
lowest level among all CIS countries at present)
substantially contributes to the rise of poverty
in Uzbekistan33.
II. The social and political 
situation
1. The instability of Uzbekistan
Co-operation with the United States did little to
improve the political situation in Uzbekistan. The
persistent economic and social problems and
uncertain political situation give rise to justified
fears (which mounted further after the recent
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terror attacks of March/April and 30th July this
year) that the country’s situation is increasingly
unstable. Moreover, if the political and social or-
der in Uzbekistan breaks down, the entire region
of Central Asia may become destabilised, since
Uzbekistan is the most populous and most mili-
tarised state among all post-Soviet republics in
Central Asia, it borders all of them, and Uzbek
minorities live in all neighbouring countries.
Social and political factors that may threaten
Uzbekistan’s stability:
1.1. The political system before 
the great test
The problem of president Islam Karimov’s suc-
cession is gaining currency in Uzbekistan. 
Karimov became first secretary of the Commu-
nist Party of Uzbekistan in 1989, and after the
country became independent in 1991 he consoli-
dated all power in his hands. In the first half of
the 1990s, he managed to effectively marginalise
secular national opposition and the Islamic mo-
vement that was emerging spontaneously, and
created a loyal and relatively stable political sys-
tem based on a forced consensus between Uzbe-
kistan’s major clans: the Samarkand clan from
which he himself had descended34, and the Tash-
kent and Ferghana clans. In the national referen-
dum held in January 2002, the Uzbeks decided to
extend Karimov’s tern in office to December 2007
by a massive majority. With all opposition groups
estranged from the political process, the exist-
ing political system developed a “dependency”
on president Karimov. 
Sovereign Uzbekistan failed to develop a transfer
of power model that could guarantee continuity.
Reports on the president’s declining health be-
gan emerging already several years ago (even if
they are not true, they add to the atmosphere of
uncertainty shared by the society and the ruling
elite). Moreover, president Karimov’s term in
office is slowly drawing to a close. He has taken
a number of measures to facilitate the transfer
of power and guarantee security for his family.
In April 2003 the parliament passed a decree gran-
ting Karimov immunity from prosecution when
he is no longer in office. Also in April, the parlia-
ment amended the constitution transferring some
of the president’s powers to the prime minister
(e.g. the power to chair the cabinet of ministers),
thus expanding the prime minister’s executive
powers and preparing ground for more indepen-
dent operation of the government in future. In
December 2003 president Karimov dismissed pri-
me minister Utkir Sultanov and appointed Shav-
kat Mirziyayev to this position (Mirziyayev comes
from the Jizzakh fraction of the Samarqand clan.
Formerly he was governor of the Samarkand
province and proved himself to be loyal to the
clan and exceptionally efficient in achieving his
goals). This raised a wave of speculations over
whether Mirziyayev’s appointment was a foun-
dation laid for the future political arrangement35.
The struggle for power is heightening. While
clan membership is the most important factor in
group identification and a pass to career, politi-
cal influence, etc., other factors such economic
and personal ties between various groups also
affect one’s position in the political scene. There
exist several decision-making centres, and the
president acts and the liaison point between
them. Political situation is shaped by alliances
between various groups, families or persons.
Such alliances among the elite are frequently
ephemeral: they are designed to address a given
task or situation. There is a widespread convic-
tion that power in the country is controlled by
the Samarkand clan, but its greatest rival, the
Tashkent clan, also holds a strong position. The
Tashkent clan leader Timur Alimov is head of the
presidential administration, and he uses this po-
sition to promote people affiliated with his clan
to high state offices (e.g. Qodir Ghulomov is the
defence minister). Among the leading clans, the
Ferghana clan has been the most underprivile-
ged and deprived of political influence at the cen-
tral level. However, given the uncertain situa-
tion in the country, this may change.
Tension in Uzbekistan and the prospects of a pos-
sible political destabilisation translate into rivalry
between the two institutions forming the secu-
rity apparatus, namely the Interior Ministry and
the National Security Service (SNB)36. The Interior
Ministry is headed by Zohirjon Almatov who
maintains contacts with Ismail Jurabekov, while
the SNB is led by Rustam Inoyatov considered to
have ties to the clan of Timur Alimov. Controlling
powerful institutions, both men are thought to
be among the most influential persons in Uzbe-
kistan.
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Finally, there are also other internal threats that
have remained dormant so far, but may be poten-
tially dangerous. They include ethnic and reli-
gious separatism, by now effectively sup-pressed
with the “strong hand” policy of the centre. The
Tajik separatism may prove to be most conse-
quential of all such movements37, as the Tajik mi-
nority complains of being discriminated against38,
while at the same time it has many representa-
tives in the ruling elite. Should Uzbekistan slip
into serious instability, there is a risk that Uzbek
Tajiks might raise demands for the Samarqand
and Bukhara areas to be incorporated into Tajiki-
stan. 
1.2. The system remains highly repressive
The authorities of Uzbekistan use any means
available to suppress the activities of their politi-
cal opponents, whom they regard as a threat to
stability and security of the state, including the
group wielding power. This task is handled most-
ly by the extended security apparatus, i.e. the In-
terior Ministry and the Security Service (SNB).
Both institutions are enormously expensive to
maintain, and their costs rise every year39. Human
rights organisations estimated the number of
functionaries at approx. 200 thousand in 2002
(the regular army has a fraction of this number
of servicemen)40. Larger and more expanded, the
Interior Ministry comprises departments of the
prevention and road police and the criminal po-
lice, but also well trained and equipped units for
the combating of terrorism, extremism and other
serious threats. The SNB is less sizeable, but it
has more informers and cooperators. Its main
tasks include to prevent threats to the constitu-
tional system, combat terror activities, and to
monitor the activities of opposition, non-govern-
mental organisations, etc. 
At this point it should be noted that widespread
corruption in Uzbekistan also affects the securi-
ty structures, a factor that may threaten law and
order in the country. Take for example the opera-
tion of police checkpoints scattered throughout
the country, whose task is to control the move-
ment of people and goods. Organised groups of
smugglers bribe policemen, and carriers pay mo-
ney to the checkpoints as they pass, thus evading
troublesome checks, etc. Almost anything can be
fixed using bribery, including the transport of
dangerous persons, explosives, weapons, etc.
The situation in courts and prisons is not much
better: with a bribe sentenced criminals can find
replacements to serve their sentence, and it is
even possible to get a man out of the death row.
Police and security service operations against real
and supposed opponents of the political system
or groups criticising the authorities frequently
involve breaches of civil freedoms and human
rights violations. Each year, the Human Rights
Watch and Freedom House publish extremely
critical reports on the human rights situation in
Uzbekistan. 
Since 1997, Islamic fundamentalism, extremism
and terrorism have been regarded as the major
enemies of Uzbek authorities, a perception that
heightened in February 1999. It is believed that
the bomb attacks in Tashkent on 16th February
1999 were carried out by Muslim extremists41
who are also responsible for the two militant
raids into Uzbekistan (the so called Batken crises
of the summer of 1999 and 2000), as the authori-
ties like to remind the public. This is the official
reason behind the stepped-up struggle against
radical Islam, which began with repression
against members and supporters of radical Mus-
lim groups. The scope of that struggle was sub-
sequently expanded to include all openly reli-
gious people who frequent mosques for prayer,
as well as men wearing beards and women who
cover their face and wear the headscarf. The
Russian Memorial organisation estimates that
approx. 9 thousand people were detained and
imprisoned on the ground of their religious prac-
tices between December 1997 and August 200142.
The authorities further “tightened the screw”
after the terror attacks in spring this year (Tash-
kent, the Bukhara area) and on 30th July. More
than 200 people allegedly involved in the attacks
were arrested according to human rights organi-
sations (the official number was 45 persons), bor-
der controls were stepped up, more police check-
points established and persons dressing “the
Muslim way” were reportedly expelled from uni-
versities. 
Torture is frequently used against detainees dur-
ing interrogation and people serving prison sen-
tences43. The 2002 report by Theo van Boven, the
UN Special Rapporteur, mentioned “systemic tor-
ture” in the Uzbek prisons, which is used as a rou-
tine measure against opponents and in the inter-
rogation process. According to a report presented
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to the Subcommittee on the Middle East and
Central Asia of the US House of Representatives,
the government of Uzbekistan failed to take any
steps whatsoever to implement the recommen-
dations of that report44.
The security services use different measures
against the two categories of the system’s oppo-
nents and critics in Uzbekistan. 
“Preventive” measures are applied with a greater
degree of caution against members of non-govern-
mental organisations defending human rights,
banned or unregistered political parties, popular
journalists and other “cases” that receive publici-
ty from the Western media. Nevertheless, such
people have no guarantee of security. They may
be kidnapped or assaulted by “unknown” perpe-
trators, accused of violating public order, or have
drugs, illegal religious literature or brochures pla-
ced in their belongings. The most notorious cases
were that of Ruslan Sharipov, a journalist inves-
tigating abuse and corruption in the police, who
was sentenced to 4 years in prison in 2003 for
homosexuality and sexual contacts with a minor,
and that of Fatima Mukhadirova, the woman
sentenced to 6 years in prison on 11th February
this year45 for membership in a religious organisa-
tion and attempted violation of the constitutional
order, whose only crime was to publicise infor-
mation about the death of her son who had died
of torture.
The police and the security service also happen
to use repression against ordinary citizens at the
request of local authorities who wish to punish
their opponents for criticising abuses committed
by local leaders against farmers or small busi-
nesses. Islamic Internet websites (e.g. www.
muslimuzbekistan.com) report on increasingly
frequent kidnappings carried out by the SNB. In
Tashkent alone, 8 people were kidnapped, inclu-
ding 4 teachers of Arabic. 
The Mahalla, or the local self-government, is also
an important instrument to control the society.
Originally, an informal council of the elders, it
has undergone gradual institutionalisation in re-
cent years. In 1999 it was transformed into an
official institution, the lowest unit of state admi-
nistration. Its members are appointed and their
tasks and competencies are set by the higher
authorities – they include granting aid to poor
families or organising local patrols. The Mahalla
are able to closely monitor local communities,
which is why they were used by the authorities
during campaigns against Muslim radicals that
followed the February 1999 bomb attacks and
the terror strikes earlier this year.
1.3. The repressive system radicalises
the public
The method of combating political opposition,
religious extremism and fundamentalism adopted
by the government of Uzbekistan is backfiring.
The Uzbek society is radicalising and, in a ten-
dency seldom observed before, increasingly open
in criticising the authorities46. The issues raised
most frequently include wrong economic policies
of the government and groups affiliated to it,
the government’s failure to take measures to cre-
ate new jobs and improve people’s living stan-
dards, and abuse of power as a way to derive
ever greater profits. 
The unsparing measures implemented by the go-
vernment against Islamic fundamentalism, ter-
rorism and extremism frequently affects people
who have nothing to do with those phenomena.
As a result of the brutality of investigators and
practices such as placing of compromising and
illegal materials in people’s belongings or forcing
testimony from suspects, hostility is mounting
among those wrongfully detained, their families
and acquaintances.
Paradoxically, as the government steps up re-
pression against Islamic fundamentalists and their
supporters in Uzbekistan, those group become
increasingly popular. In particular, this refers to
Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (the Islamic Party of Libe-
ration) which is powerful in Uzbekistan, with
the strongest presence in the Uzbek part of the
Ferghana Valley.
2. No bright prospects 
for democratisation 
Although the constitution of Uzbekistan guaran-
tees a democratic system of government, the
country only has a democratic facade. The politi-
cal system is tightly controlled by president Ka-
rimov and a narrow group of people. The political
elite, which emerged from the old communist
nomenklatura, has no public legitimacy because
the elections do not meet democratic standards,
there is no honest electoral rivalry or campaign-
ing and the electoral laws leave much to be de-
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sired. For these reasons, the country’s leaders
only represent themselves. The gap is widening
between this small privileged group and the so-
ciety that cannot decide for itself and its country.
The party system is based on one dominant par-
ty, the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan,
and a few legal systemic47 parties. In Uzbekistan
one has to cooperate with the president’s admi-
nistration to play any role whatsoever in politics.
Addressing the middle class and calling for politi-
cal and economic reform, the Liberal Democratic
Party founded in November 2003 and headed by
the Pakhtabank CEO Qobiljon Tashmatov was
advertised as a political alternative. If fact, the
party founders received president’s Karimov’s
personal approval even before the founding con-
gress of the party was held.
The two major opposition groups: the Birlik (Uni-
ty) movement and the Erk (Freedom) Democratic
Party48 are in a different situation. They have been
banned and are now trying to come back to pub-
lic life, but without much success: they face per-
secution by the authorities and lack public sup-
port. The authorities are not interested to have
those parties reactivated just before the parlia-
mentary elections scheduled for December 2004,
and the legalisation proposals that the authori-
ties make now and then49 should be regarded as
simulated measures. 
The activists of Birlik (which is not a party in for-
mal terms and cannot run in the elections under
Uzbek law) managed to organise 7 regional con-
gresses in April 2002 without any intervention
of the state authorities. In August 2002 Pulat
Ahun, one of the most important Birlik members,
returned to Uzbekistan after seven years of emi-
gration, but he did not start any political activity. 
The Erk party also tried to make it into politics,
but accused of having links to terror organisa-
tions, it is in a much more difficult position than
Birlik. In May 2002 it managed to organise a meet-
ing, but its secretary general Otanazar Aripov
was detained by officers of the Interior Ministry.
In June and October 2003 Erk held congresses
(without Muhammad Solih) in spite of provoca-
tions by the security services. Presently, however,
Erk has split into three segments in practice it
does not exist.
On 21st May the Ministry of Justice refused to
register Birlik (claiming, inter alia, that signatures
in the lists of supporters had been forged), and on
26th June the Supreme Court sustained the Minis-
try’s decision, barring Birlik from the December
parliamentary elections. Erk did not apply for re-
gistration because according to Aripov and his
supporters, the party had been banned by the
Ministry of Justice, while under the laws in force
only a court may outlaw a party. Erk members
intend to run in the elections as independent
candidates.
Non-governmental organisations promoting de-
mocratic institutions, freedom of the media and
human rights also have ever less room for ma-
noeuvre. They have always been treated as politi-
cal opponents by the Uzbek authorities (they
were committed to criticising anti-democratic
moves of the government and would call50 on the
US administration to stop assistance and restrict
relations with Tashkent unless the human rights
situation improves radically). In the first half of
2002 the NGOs were granted a little more free-
dom, but not for long. After the successful “rose
revolution” in Georgia, Tashkent tightened con-
trol over organisations active in Uzbekistan that
had cooperated with the Georgian opposition
(e.g. the Open Society Institute of George Soros51).
On 22nd January 2004 the government restored
the law, enacted back in 1999, under which for-
eign non-governmental organisations must regis-
ter with the Ministry of Justice in addition to re-
gistration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
making it much more difficult for foreign NGOs
to obtain the necessary permits.
Free access to information and freedom of the
media do not exist in Uzbekistan. Private media
have not managed to undermine the monopolis-
tic position of state-owned media. The latter are
instruments of the official policy, serve propa-
ganda and fail to honestly inform the public52.
The abolition of censorship in July 2002 did not
improve the situation53 because the authorities
maintained close control of the media market.
Authors who criticise the authorities or reveal
compromising facts about state officials (e.g.
corruption) and editors who publish this kind of
material are at risk of ruthless attacks by the
police and security services. For this reason self-
-censorship is widespread in Uzbekistan, and
few journalists dare to risk their jobs, freedom
or the existence of their editors54.
It is prohibited to import any religious literature
to Uzbekistan, and the prohibition is reinforced
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by tight control of the Internet55. Certain web-
sites such as www.muslimuzbekistan.com,
www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org, but sometimes also
www.bbc.com) are blocked, and owners of Inter-
net cafes are obliged to remind internet users of
the prohibition to visit the banned pages, and to
report all “suspected cases” to the police (a re-
ward of approx. US$ 46 is offered for assistance
leading to the arrest of a person suspected of vi-
siting banned pages)56.
3. Islamic fundamentalism – 
an alternative to the political system 
Secular opposition in Uzbekistan is weak, under
the authorities’ surveillance, and lacks public sup-
port. Opposition of the society is more likely to
be channelled through religion. Yet it is not the
official Islam, or popular Islam, or even Sufi Islam
that voice opposition sentiments, but rather the
politically committed radical Islam. The former
three branches have been pacified by the state
apparatus, which controls them and uses them
in its struggle against Muslim fundamentalism. 
The highest Muslim authority – the Spiritual
Board of the Muslims of Uzbekistan (Muftiyat)
has been practically incorporated into the state
structures and fully supports the state’s policy
on religion. Friday “sermons” are not authored
by the mosque imams and they have to be
approved by the Muftiyat. The Muftiyat is at the
authorities disposal, also in terms of the appoint-
ments and dismissals of imams. Moreover, the
authorities frequently resort to the provision of
article 8 of the law on religion57. Leaders of offi-
cial Islam often speak out in campaign against
radical Islam. They try to demonstrate that radi-
calism is foreign to the variety of Islam typical
for the area, that it is an aberration of the teach-
ing of Islam and that its leaders lack proper reli-
gious education.
For most Muslims in Uzbekistan, who account for
approx. 88 percent of the country’s population,
fundamental norms and values are defined by the
so called popular Islam which includes many
(often non-Islamic) elements of local traditions.
Popular Islam survived Soviet repression and is
gaining importance presently. Generally the
authorities do not restrict religious activities of
believers, but they are closely watching the de-
velopment of this branch of Islam, remembering
that with poor religious education, the believers
may be susceptible to religious propaganda from
abroad58. 
The “protection” of Sufi Islam is also intended as
an instrument of supervision and propaganda.
On the one hand, the authorities are building
the image of Uzbekistan as a country that sup-
ports59 Sufism, the “friendly” variety of Islam and
an alternative to fundamentalism, both for the
West and for the official internal propaganda.
On the other hand, the authorities remember
that the Sufi tradition has a record of brother-
hoods that fought the government and inspired
insurgencies. For this reason the state keeps close
watch over this branch of Islam. The system of
hierarchy and unconditional obedience of stu-
dents (murid) to teachers (sheikh, pir) found in
Sufi Islam is regarded as dangerous. Therefore,
religious meetings of the Sufis are monitored by
security agents.
Popular Islam and Sufism (the elements of which
form part of popular Islam, with many mosque
imams being at the same time Sufis) are also used
by the authorities in the fight against Muslim
fundamentalism. The government is taking mea-
sures to transform the Islamic tradition into a
museum piece (e.g. through renovation of his-
toric monuments) that will be interesting to
know about and attractive to tourists, but not
viable and full of life. 
The three branches of Islam (official, popular
and Sufism) are incapable of voicing criticism and
oppositionary moods. Those can only be chan-
nelled through the ideology of radical Islam that
makes a powerful political stand and provides
ready solutions to mend the country’s political
and social situation (through obedience to the
precepts of Islam). 
After the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan was
eliminated, first in Uzbekistan and then in
Afghanistan as a result of the US military cam-
paign in that country, the Islamic Liberation Par-
ty or Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami is the only major
fundamentalist group remaining in Uzbekistan.
Despite repression, it is gaining popularity both
in Uzbekistan and in other Central Asian coun-
tries60. This proves that its programme (social
justice, abolition or borders) is attractive, and its
methods (emphasis on self-education, charity,
etc.) effective, as the organisation successfully
attracts young people, the unemployed and the
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poor, but also well-educated people. Hizb ut-Tah-
rir is gaining importance in Uzbekistan, even
though the authorities are cracking down on the
organisation ever more violently. Members of
Hizb ut-Tahrir are accused of carrying out the ter-
ror attacks in late March/early April and on 30th
July. At present it is difficult to determine whet-
her those allegations are right – in its programme
the party calls for abolition of secular rule, elimi-
nation of borders and barriers between coun-
tries, creation of an Islamic caliphate throughout
Central Asia and implementation of the divine
law as formulated in the Koran and the Hadis,
using peaceful means. 
It should also be remembered that other radical
organisations calling for abolition of the present
system are reportedly active in Uzbekistan (al-
though no details are available on the number of
their members and supporters, the reach of their
operations, etc.). The Islamic Jihad Group, which
allegedly claimed responsibility for the 30th July
suicide attack through its website, may serve as
an example. As the Uzbek society is radicalising,
such organisations may win wider support in the
near future. 
4. Uzbekistan – America’s 
troublesome ally 
Consequences of the terror attacks of 11th Sep-
tember 2001 and the global war on terror decla-
red subsequently brought revolutionary change
to Central Asia and Uzbekistan. The country sup-
ported the military operation in Afghanistan
more than any other state in the region (e.g. by
making its air space and the Khanabad base
available to the coalition). This opened a period
of close political and military cooperation be-
tween Washington and Tashkent. The highest US
military officials and representatives of the US
Departments of State and Defence were frequent
guests to Tashkent. The culmination came with
president Islam Karimov’s visit to the United Sta-
tes on 11th – 14th March 2002, as a result of which
the strategic partnership agreement was signed
between Uzbekistan and the US. Uzbekistan be-
came the top recipient of assistance funds among
all countries of the region. It received a total of
79 million US$ worth of assistance in 2002 and
US$ 30.2 million in 2003 (the total amount was
US$ 86.1 million and included 14.7 million for
the development of democracy; 18.2 million for
social and economic programmes; 18.5 million
for humanitarian assistance and 4.5 million for
various other initiatives, in addition to security
projects). 
The Washington administration was open about
the primary goal of its extensive political, mili-
tary and financial commitments: to work towards
stability and security in Uzbekistan and indirect-
ly, throughout the region. The objective was to
counter Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism
not only through political and military coopera-
tion, but also through elimination of the systemic
causes of rising fundamentalism, i.e. the repres-
sive political system and economic underdevelop-
ment. 
The cooperation between Uzbekistan and the
United States failed to trigger internal reforms
in the country, as the West (the EU and the USA)
had hoped. Declarations about closer coopera-
tion with the West and gradual implementation
of political and economic reforms were not put
in effect. The authorities of Uzbekistan and their
Western partners had different visions of what
the political and social system of Uzbekistan
should be. Western countries wanted progres-
sive democratisation of Uzbekistan’s political
system, pluralism, respect for human rights, free-
dom of the media, market economy, etc, while
president Karimov repeatedly criticised the West
for assessing change in Uzbekistan based on Wes-
tern European notions and without taking into
account the local reality and tradition. He also
emphasised that he was sceptical about the uni-
versality of democratic values, adding that they
should not be a precondition of cooperation, but
rather its final result.
In response to the building threat to Uzbeki-
stan’s stability, as exposed by the terror attacks
in late March/early April and on 30th July, the
authorities in Tashkent resorted to the proven
measure, i.e. further tightened the internal policy.
This leads to tension between Washington and
Tashkent. The United States has realised that
continued assistance61 to the most authoritarian
regime in Central Asia62, responsible for nume-
rous clashes with its neighbours (including bor-
der incidents, reluctance to cooperate on the ma-
nagement of water resources, creating barriers
to trade), was seriously damaging the United
States’ image as the country that promotes de-
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mocracy in the world and counters the systemic
roots of Muslim fundamentalism (especially since
the electoral campaign in USA was under way).
In Uzbekistan as well as in other Central Asian
countries anti-American sentiments are rising,
fuelled by the situation in the region and in the
world63. The authorities in Tashkent have become
more open to proposals of economic, political
and security cooperation with Russia and China
(increased volume of trade exchange, projected
investments, mutual visits of leading politicians,
and cooperation within the Shanghai Coopera-
tion Organisation which is gaining momentum).
The Americans have tried to support Birlik’s
return to political life in Uzbekistan (the subject
was discussed in Tashkent by high Department
of State officials), but this comeback attempt en-
ded as a fiasco. The American non-governmental
organisations including the National Democratic
Institute and the International Republican Insti-
tute were admonished that cooperating with the
outlawed Erk and Birlik was a violation of the
Uzbek law. Finally, the Open Society Institute of
George Soros, the organisation that finances its
projects with American funding, is having to
withdraw from Uzbekistan.
III. Prospects
The situation in Uzbekistan is worrying and so
tense that the probability is high of a social out-
-break based on economic or political grounds or
a violent political and social crisis triggered by
rivalry between the various factions. Three years
after the start of close cooperation with the Uni-
ted States, Uzbekistan’s strong international posi-
tion is wearing away. The chance the country had
been afforded by a period of the West’s increased
interest in the region has unfortunately been lost.
In the uncertain political situation the probable
scenario is that the clans will confront one
another and the most powerful candidates will
vie to take control in the country after president
Karimov leaves office. This will entail a reorgani-
sation of the political scene and a new division
of influence in the economy.
The most worrying factor, however, is the des-
perate economic situation of the Uzbek society,
the absence of prospects for a rapid improvement
and the rising radicalism. Difficult to predict, this
may potentially cause an outbreak of mass de-
monstrations that may develop into riots.
Should this scenario materialise, the country’s
stability will be under a serious threat, as the
state structures may disintegrate totally or partly
depending on the scale (size and reach) of pro-
tests, the way they are directed and the reaction
of the police and security services. In that case,
the ideology of Islam and the groups that refer
to it as a factor of social mobilisation may play 
a very important role.
Grzegorz Zasada
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Annex
Uzbekistan: Selected economic 
and security figures
1. GDP growth in successive years: 
4.1 percent (1999), 4.0 percent (2000), 4.5 per-
cent (2001), 4,2 percent (2002), 4.0 percent (2003)
– official government data; 3.2 percent (2002),
0.3 percent (2003) – data of the IMF
2. Per capita GDP: 340 US$ (2003) (240 in
Tajikistan, 345 in Kyrgyzstan, 1970 in Kazakh-
stan) – Economist Intelligence Unit
3. Consumer price index (end of year): 
28.2 percent (2000), 26.4 percent (2001), 22 per-
cent (2002), 18.4 percent (2003) – Transition
Report 2003, the EBRD.
4. Direct foreign investments: 
US$ 140 million (1998), US$ 570 million (2001),
US$ 65 million (2002) – totally till the end of
2002 1,3 bln US$ – the EBRD, US$ 650 million
(2002), US$ 14 billion (1992–2002) – official gov-
ernment data
5. Per capita direct foreign investments: 
US$ 2.5 (2002); US$ 50 (1992–2000) (for compa-
rison: US$ 564 in Kazakhstan, US$ 30 in
Tajikistan, US$ 92 in Kyrgyzstan, US$ 176 in
Turkmenistan) – Economist Intelligence Unit
6. Economic freedom ranking: 149th posi-
tion among 156 countries studied (2003) –
Heritage Foundation, The Wall Street Journal
7. Corruption index: 68th position among
102 countries studied (2002), (for comparison,
Kazakhstan is in the 88th position) –
Transparency International
8. Foreign assistance to SMEs: US$ 180
million (1996–2003) – the EBRD 
9. Defence spending: US$ 1,797,000 million,
US$ 70 per capita, 2.9 percent of the GDP (2002),
(for comparison, US$ 265 million in Kyrgyzstan)
– The Military Balance 2003–2004 
10. Defence Ministry budget: US$ 74 mil-
lion (2001), US$ 46 million (2002, 2003) – The
Military Balance 2003–2004
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1 Uzbekistan is one of the seven CIS countries with the low-
est revenue (the remaining six include Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). Turkmeni-
stan is not included in this list because insufficient data is
available. Among those seven countries, Uzbekistan repor-
ted the lowest GDP growth between 1998 and 2003, i.e. 2.7
percent (3.6 percent in Kyrgyzstan, 7.1 percent in Tajiki-
stan), and also in 2003: 0.3 percent; in: IMF, World Economic
Outlook, 2003. It should be noted that GDP figures usually
quoted by the government of Uzbekistan are higher. 
2 The term “clan” in Uzbekistan refers to people coming
from the same region rather than people who are related.
There are five major clans in Uzbekistan, namely the Kho-
rezm, Surkhandarya – Qashqadarya, Samarqand, Tashkent
and Ferghana clans; the latter three top the clan hierarchy.
3 According to the World Bank report published in mid
2003, more than 1/4 of the population of Uzbekistan live in
poverty, and 1/3 of them fall below poverty line.
4 In early July this year, president Islam Karimov signed a re-
gulation providing for a 30-percent rise of salaries in the
public sector (the minimum monthly salary will rise to 6530
sums, i.e. US$ 6.40 US$, and the minimum old age pension
to 12920 soms, i.e. approx. US$ 12.80 as of 1st August). 
5 According to unofficial sources, 500 to 700 thousand peo-
ple leave to seek employment each year; in: “Central Asia:
A Last Chance for Change”, ICG Asia Briefing Paper, 29th
April 2003, www.crisisweb.org 
6 According to official data, 12 thousand in 2000 and 24.6
thousand in 200, in: Kazakhstan: The 2003 Statistical Year-
book. Real figures are presumably several times higher be-
cause a massive majority of those stays are illegal. 
7 In 2003 and 2004 reports appeared on a growing number
of women from Uzbekistan who work as prostitutes, e.g. in
the largest city of southern Kyrgyzstan – Osh, in:
www.iwpr.net
8 Due to objective geographic and climate difficulties, farmers
are dependent on the local state structures for technical assis-
tance including permanent and regular supply of water.
9 E.g. as the centre controls cotton revenues, local officials
make up for lost revenue at the expense of the local people,
for example by demanding higher bribes.
10 Presently the cotton sector is controlled by Elyor Ganiyev
who heads the Agency for Foreign Economic Relations.
11 There are three kinds of agricultural farms in Uzbekistan:
sherkat (a contemporary version of the Soviet kolkhoz), large
private farms, and dehkon (small vegetable plots whose pro-
duce is sold in bazaars). The main crops grown in the former
two types include cotton and grain – the sherkat and large
private farms are the principal instrumental in the imple-
mentation of the state’s agricultural policy, since only in
the small plots are farmers free to decide what to grow, in:
“Uzbekistan’s Reform Program: Myth or Reality?”, in: www.
crisisweb.org, 18th February 2003. 
12 Companies procuring raw cotton are controlled by the
government and the state-owned monopoly Uzkhlopko-
prom procures 98.7 percent of the production volume.
13 Figures quoted on 13th February 2004 by the State Sta-
tistics Committee of Uzbekistan.
14 Interestingly, the Andijan district that tops the ranking of
cotton producers and achieves the production targets saw
the fewest changes in the hokim’s office between
1993–2002, in: Alisher Ilkhamov, “The Limits of Centraliza-
tion. Regional Challenges in Uzbekistan”, p. 170, in: The
Transformation of Central Asia. States and Societies from
Soviet Rule to Independence, ed. Paulina Jones Luong, Cor-
nell University Press, New York 2004, p. 159–181.
15 Amro Bank is the only foreign bank that has a branch in
Uzbekistan. 
16 Banking secrecy is not kept, and banks readily provide
information on the operations in their customers’ accounts
to the state authorities. 
17 Under cover of different activities, specialist companies
provide bank withdrawal services and collect commission
on cash withdrawals from the banks. This is why non-cash
money is cheaper. 
18 Bank officers profit from reinforcing this corruption-
-generating system.
19 Delays in the payment of salaries and benefits occur from
time to time. Recently, this provoked a growing number of
strikes and demonstrations (e.g. workers of the refinery
and chemical plants in Ferghana protested in August 2003,
followed by old age and disability pensioners in Andijan in
January 2004, and in December 2003, attorneys went on
strike to protest against too low salaries).
20 They were allowed to purchase foreign currency at the
state-defined rate, which is lower than in the black market,
and then resold it in the black market cashing in profits on
the exchange rate difference. 
21 It should be remembered that the economic policies of
Uzbekistan are largely run by people from the post-commu-
nist nomenklatura with limited qualifications in economy,
and the administrative apparatus that implements the eco-
nomic policy is also unprepared to act in market economy
conditions. The bureaucracy in Uzbekistan saw the smallest
degree of personnel change among all Central Asian coun-
tries, in: “The Failure of Reform in Uzbekistan: Ways For-
ward for the International Community”, www.crisisweb.
org, 11th March 2004.
22 In 2001, such establishment employed half of all em-
ployed people in Uzbekistan. Data provided by the World
Bank; in: “Political Obstacles to Economic Reform in
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Strategies to Move
Ahead", Pauline Jones Luong, www.cis-7.org, January 2003.
23 It is difficult to estimate the amount of direct and indirect
expenses to this end. Uzbekistan was forced to subsidise its
large enterprises also from foreign loans.
24 Corruption is high, though its level is similar to other
countries in the region. In the Transparency International
Corruption Perceptions Index 2002, Uzbekistan is in the
68th position among 102 countries studied; www.transpa-
rency.org
25 The decree “On regulation of the import of goods to the
territory of Uzbekistan by private persons” dated 6th May
2002. 
26 www.ebrd.org
27 The Agreement Establishing the EBRD contains a provi-
sion on assisting reconstruction and economic develop-
U
z
b
e
k
is
ta
n
: 
th
e
 m
a
jo
r 
s
o
u
rc
e
 o
f 
in
s
ta
b
il
it
y
 i
n
 C
e
n
tr
a
l 
A
s
ia
?
82
C E S  S t u d i e s
ment in those countries that work towards implementing
democracy, pluralism and market economy.
28 Presently, annual commitment of the ADB in Uzbekistan
amounts to approx. US$ 150 million, www.adb.org.
29 Net direct foreign investments. Data of the EBRD. There
is a clear discrepancy between this figure and official data:
the amount quoted by the Uzbek government for the same
year is US$ 650 million. 
30 In the period from independence to the end of 2000, per
capita investments amounted to US$ 37, i.e. were slightly
higher than in Tajikistan (US$ 30), in: www.eiu.com
31 BEEPS research (Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Surveys) carried out by the EBRD and the
World Bank in 1999 and 2002, in : Franklin Steves, Samuel
Fankhauser, Alan Rousso, “The Business Environment in the
CIS-7 Countries”, February 2004, www.cis-7.org.
32 The German economic mission closed down after work-
ing in Uzbekistan for 10 years. Trade exchange between the
two countries dropped from EUR 500 million in 1997 to
EUR 225 million in 2003 Source: “Are German business
withdrawing from Uzbekistan?”, InoSMI.ru, Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, 29.06.2004. 
33 Uzbekistan Country Brief 2003, www.worldbank.org.
34 Even within the Samarqand clan, loyalty to president
Karimov should not be taken for granted. In the past it was
noted that the clans present leader Ismail Jurabekov was
prone to challenge Karimov.
35 According to experts Shavkat Mirziyayev may not suc-
ceed Islam Karimov as president. 
36 There were a lot of questions about the terror attacks of
late March and early April this year. In May 2004 it was fre-
quently claimed that they could have been carried out only
with the knowledge and approval of the security apparatus
whose members were either directly responsible or had
given a discreet consent. The general public in Uzbekistan
believes that it is possible to buy people ready to carry out
suicide attacks in return for a compensation paid to the
bomber’s family. In unofficial conversations, even security
officers admitted that the society’s financial situation is so
poor that people may indeed be willing to carry out an
attacks for money. Based on interviews performed by CES
staff Uzbekistan in May 2004.
37 Tajiks account for approx. 5 percent of the population of
Uzbekistan. Most of them live in Bukhara and Samarqand,
the historic centres of Tajik culture and statehood.
38 On 4th September 2003, the Tojikiston daily published in
Tajikistan publicised an appeal of Tajiks from Samarkand
calling for the barriers to educational and cultural develop-
ment of Tajiks in Uzbekistan be removed. The authors
requested the Tajik president Emomali Rahmonov’s assis-
tance in this matter. The situation of Uzbek Tajiks resettled
in 2000 from the area near the Tajik border to inner
Uzbekistan is dramatic after they have been moved to the
infertile areas near Sherabad.
39 The Ministry of Defence budget decreased by US$ 28 mil-
lion (from US$ 74 million to US$ 46 million) between 2001–
–2002 and the duration of military service was reduced from
18 to 12 months. However, security spending (a category
that includes the Ministry of Defence budget) increased
from US$ 1750 million to US$ 1797 million during the same
period, in: “The Military Balance 2003–2004”, The Inter-
national Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford University
Press, London 2003.
40 “Central Asia: The Politics of Police Reform”, 10th Decem-
ber 2002, www.crisisweb.org
41 Opponents of president Karimov claim that the attacks
were prepared and carried out by the authorities seeking 
a pretext to step up the campaign against radical Islam. 
42 Memorial, Spisok arestovannikh i osuzhdionnikh po poli-
ticheskim i religioznym motivam v Uzbekistanie – dekabr
1997–august 2001, Moscow 2001.
43 The authorities of Uzbekistan have long denied the use
of torture in prisons, even though the use of torture in
Uzbekistan had been widely reported long before the offi-
cial admission in Brussels (27th January 2003) by the foreign
minister Sodiq Safoyev that torture does take place but not
on a systemic basis. During his speech at the EBRD session
in Tashkent on 4th – 5th May 2003 president Karimov did not
even mention torture, contrary to the Western visitor’s ex-
pectations.
44 “Uzbekistan: The Key to Success in Central Asia”, Lorne
W. Craner, Assistant Secretary of the US Department of Sta-
te Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 15 June
2004, http://www.house.gov./international_relations/108/
cra061504.htm
45 Following the intervention of Western organisations, the
media and the British ambassador, the imprisonment sen-
tence was replaced with a fine.
46 The author was surprised at the outrage and openness of
people criticising the authorities’ doings – the public is
much more openly angry than it was in the autumn of
2002. 
47 In an effort to create an appearance of political pluralism,
it is usually the authorities who inspire the formation of
new parties. The task of legally operating parties including
Adolat (Justice), Milli Tiklanish (National Revival), Fidokor-
lar (Patriots), and the Party of Farmers and Entrepreneurs,
is to mobilise certain social and professional groups. They
hardly succeed as the society refused to be involved in a po-
litical farce: people interviewed for this paper were fre-
quently unable to name parties existing in Uzbekistan, let
alone their programmes. The Party of Free Farmers (Ozod
Dehqon Partiasi) is a real opposition formation. It is invol-
ved in large-scale propaganda activities, but has not been
able to obtain a registration. 
48 They were banned back in the first half of the 1990s and
their leaders forced to leave the country. Abdurahim Pulat,
the leader of Birlik, lives in the US, and Muhammad Solih
who heads Erk in Norway. Muhammad Solih (persona non
grata in Uzbekistan) is accused by the authorities of links to
terror organisations and involvement in the preparation
and carrying out of the bomb attacks in February 1999 
49 For example, president Karimov’s statement of 4th April
2002 in which he said he was ready to meet the émigré
activists provided they abandoned their ambition to force-
fully abolish the system.
50 Especially Human Rights Watch, Freedom House, and
Open Society Institute of George Soros.
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51 On 14th April, the Ministry of Justice refused to extend
the permit for the Open Society Institute, an organisation
that had spent US$ 22 million on various programmes in
Uzbekistan since 1996 and managed a portion of American
aid to the country (e.g. as part of USAID).
52 For a long time the public was unaware that the author-
ities had made the Khanabad base available to the
Americans.
53 In August the Defence Ministry notified editors that they
were required to send all articles on security, military and
similar matters to the Ministry for “consultation”.
54 For example, in February and March 2003 three journalists
were arrested, and one of them was imprisoned for alleged
links to Hizb ut-Tahrir; the Milli Talim (National Education)
paper affiliated to the Ministry of Education was closed down
for “grammar errors”, and another – Adolat (Justice) was sus-
pended; in: “Uzbekistan: Rights Groups Say Press Crackdown
Under Way”, www.rferl.org, 6th March 2003.
55 It is easy for the authorities to control Internet users in
Uzbekistan who numbered only 310 thousand in 2003.
56 The police also resort to provocation. Internet cafe staff
members may be held accountable if the police catch them
tolerating users visiting the banned websites,
www.forum18.org
57 Under Article 8 of the Law on religion, any citizen with
"adequate education" may be a religious leader. This means
that the authorities only approve those who have complet-
ed the madrassas (Muslim schools) strictly controlled by the
state, and successfully passed the exams in which state
officials are among the examination boards.
58 Because of its territorial character and the importance of
the worship of local saints, popular Islam is not susceptible
to external influence and the believers show little interest
in Muslim literature published abroad. 
59 This includes systematic renovation of places related to
the Sufis (the completely overhauled religious complex near
Bukhara which is related to Bahauddin Naqshbandi, the
founder of the Naqshbandiyya brotherhood, is enormously
impressive), as well as cooperation with the Islamic Su-
preme Council of America, a organisation of the Naqsh-
bandiyya brotherhood supporters in the US which was in-
vited to act as observers during the 2000 presidential elec-
tions.
60 According to conservative estimates, Hizb ut-Tahrir may
have 15–20 thousand members in Central Asia and at least
as many supporters. A massive majority of them act in
Uzbekistan, and the organisation is growing in numbers.
According to unconfirmed information, Hizb ut-Tahrir sup-
porters are found among the medium level administration
officials. 
61 After several warnings that assistance to Uzbekistan
would be limited if the human rights situation did not im-
prove, on 13th July the Department of State communicated
that US$ 18 million worth of assistance had been suspended.
62 Turkmenistan should be regarded as a totalitarian state.
63 People interviewed in Uzbekistan estimate that approx.
80 percent of the society are opposed to the policy of the
authorities who verbally supported the US operation in
Iraq. It is believed that the real motives behind the US inter-
vention are to reinforce its dominance in the world and to
control Iraqi oil. Based on interviews by Centre for Eastern
Studies staff, Uzbekistan, May 2004.
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